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I. THE CRITERION FOR ATTRIBUTION
ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
According to the criterion for attribution established in article 5 of
the International Law Commission's ("ILC") Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts ("2001 ILC Draft"), a
State is internationally responsible for the conduct of entities
empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority. 1 The
proliferation of autonomous entities within the State favored
including the criterion for attribution in the ILC's work in 1974.
Indeed, taking the non-absolute nature of article 5 of the draft
adopted in first reading as a starting point, Rapporteur Roberto Ago,
who was devoted to the attributing to the State of conduct of its own
organs, deemed it necessary to refer to other acts that could be
attributed to the State as a potential source of international
responsibility when behavior of individuals or groups could not be
strictly classified as state organs under domestic law. This led the
Commission to adopt the attribution criteria contained in article 7 of
1. See Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4, available at
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/91 12011 .pdf
[hereinafter Draft Articles] (establishing state responsibility under international
law for the acts of persons or entities that are not organs of the State, so long as the
actor is empowered by the law of that State to exercise aspects of governmental
authority and is acting in that capacity).
2. See generally U.N. Intl'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on State
Responsibility with Commentaries Thereto Adopted By the International Law
Commission on First Reading (Jan. 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Draft Articles with
Commentaries] (explaining that the abbreviation "ILC Draft 1996" is used to refer
to the draft approved on first reading by the ILC on July 12, 1996, in spite of the
fact that the first part of this draft, relating to the origin of the responsibility, was
approved in 1980).
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the ILC Draft 1996 at its twenty-sixth session. Specifically, this
provision stated that:
1. The conduct of an organ of a territorial governmental entity within a
State shall also be considered as an act of that State under international
law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in
question.
2. The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal
structure of the State or of a territorial governmental entity, but which is
empowered by the internal law of that State to exercise elements of the
governmental authority, shall also be considered as an act of the State
under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in
the case in question. 3
Specifically, Rapporteur Ago was referring to the actions and
omissions of organs of public institutions different from the State,
which he classified into two major categories.4 On the one hand,
there are public establishments and other public institutions with
their own personality that have autonomous leadership and
management and whose mission was to provide a certain service or
exercise certain functions. On the other hand, there are public
territorial communities that are characterized by a general public
activity but developed at the local or regional level, which later were
integrated under the expression "organ" for the purposes of the
attribution of conduct to the State.5
The need to address these public institutions' acts from the State
Responsibility point of view resulted from the increasing formation
and proliferation of these public establishment at that time.6 Despite
3. Id. at 26.
4. Cf id. (noting that organs, which are separate from the State but are
empowered by internal law to exercise governmental authority, can be separate due
to the organs' territorial jurisdictions or the special nature of the organs'
functions).
5. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 4 ("The conduct of any state organ shall
be considered an act of that state under international law, whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it
holds in the organization of the state, and whatever its character as an organ of the
central Government or of a territorial unit of the state.").
6. See Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Third Rep. on State
Responsibility, The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of
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a clearly public mission, these institutions possessed a different
personality from a domestic law perspective, had its own
organization separate from the State, and were subject to a sui
generis legal regime in their activities that is covert for some public
law matters and for some private law matters.7 In short, although
these institutions had their own organization, they provided services
and performed duties of a public nature. According to the
Commission and relevant State practice in these cases, the principle
of state unity would justify the attribution criterion from an
international perspective.8
Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the phenomenon in the 1970s,
few precedents and opinions existed to confirm this phenomenon.
Some scholars considered the nature of the function assumed was the
decisive element in this criterion, not the exercise of the functions by
State or non-state bodies.9 That is, the criterion for determining this
type of entity should be the common feature that characterizes them:
being empowered to exercise certain functions pertaining to those
exercised by State organs.'0 Moreover, as Rapporteur Ago pointed
International Responsibility, Int'l Law Comm'n, 164, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246
(1971) (by Roberto Ago) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Third Report]
(indicating five main causes for this phenomenon: (1) the diversity of common
interest tasks that the collectivity should perform in a modem society; (2) the
increasing number of services that only the collectivity is able to provide; (3) the
progressive extension of services to the most diverse sectors of economic, social,
and cultural life; (4) the technical nature of the services, frequently requiring both
autonomy and decisive action while possessing expertise; and (5) the need to give
greater flexibility to procedures and to reduce controls to ensure the effectiveness
of services).
7. See id. (describing these institutions as "para-state institutions," meaning
they are organized separate from the State but execute public tasks in conjunction
with the State).
8. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 26th Sess., May 6-July 26, 1974, at 162,
U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1; GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1974) [hereinafter
Int'l Law. Comm'n 26th Sess. Report] (noting that the Commission's work has
"exercised a definite influence" on the development of legal opinion across all
sectors of the international legal order).
9. See 1997 Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra note 2, at 30-31
(conveying that the Preparatory Committee for the 1930 Codification Conference
created precedence for determining state responsibility for the actions of non-state
entities on the basis of the legislative or administrative nature of the entity's public
functions).
10. See Int'l Law. Comm'n 26th Sess. Report, supra note 8, at 282 (dismissing
other criteria for determining this type of entity, such as the definition of public or
[30:4798
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out, a different solution would be illogical and even unrealistic
because the distribution of public functions between the State itself
and other entities previously reflected an organizational technique
that varies from one system to another, whereas an act or omission
carried out in performing the same, single public service could be
considered a state act in some cases and not others from the
international law perspective.11 Therefore, from the international law
perspective, this explains the need to categorically recognize that the
conduct of the personnel of these establishments or institutions has to
be qualified as an act of the State to be able to generate international
responsibility.12 Thus, when this attribution criterion was adopted,
the ILC provided that an established standard existed on the matter
and providing that it was imperative to make such a rule to promote
"clarity in international relations" and "progressive development of
international law." 
13
In the late 1990s, in referring to this attribution criterion, Special
Rapporteur James Crawford noted the increasing number of
parastate bodies performing governmental functions and made
necessary to address the issue.14 However, while recognizing the
need to include this attribution rule and thereby proposing its
maintenance, it is still necessary to examine its scope and provide
private, the more or less extensive public participation in its capital, and state
control).
11. See Special Rapporteur, Third Report, supra note 6, at 256 (asserting that
basing a state's responsibility on its distribution of public functions could lead to
discrepancies over responsibilities for an identical public function because various
methods of organization are used by different states).
12 E.g., Observations and Comments of Governments on Chapters , II and I1
of Part 1 of the Draft Articles on Sate Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful
Act, [1980] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/328 and Add.l-4
[hereinafter Observations and Comments of Governments] (expressing
disagreement among the States with respect to the scope of this rule of attribution,
such as Canada's observation in 1980 that the circumstances in which a State
should be considered responsible for those acts had to be "more restrictively
drafted").
13. Int'l Law. Comm'n 26th Sess. Report, supra note 8, at 282.
14. See Special Rapporteur, First Rep. on State Responsibility, Int'l Law
Comm'n, at 39, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/490 and Add.1-7 (1998) (by James Crawford)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur, First Report] (stressing the importance of
addressing the proliferation of para-state entities in article 7 despite some States'
concerns).
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recent examples of its field of application.15 In contrast, Crawford
references a precedent that the Commission used in 1974 and
commented some of the expressions used in the provision.16 Thus,
this rule is meant to encompass individuals, such as private security
guards acting as prison guards, to the extent that they exercises
public functions, including the power to detain and enforce
compliance with judicial sentences or prison regulations.17 With
respect to the expressions used, he pointed out that the maintenance
of the term "entity" was provided because it has a meaning
sufficiently broad as to encompass many different realities, such as
territorial public entities, public establishments, parastate entities,
various public institutions, and companies under private law in
special cases. ' 8
With regard to the expression, "an entity which is empowered by
the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental
authority," Crawford stated it was the most appropriate because it
reflects the true common feature of these entities.19 In the words of
the Rapporteur, "being empowered, even if only in an exceptional
and limited way, to perform certain functions that are related to those
normally exercised by State bodies."2
This statement raises a number of questions, primarily in regard to
the way that this power is granted, because the statement does not
specify how these entities can be empowered. In other words, it does
not indicate whether such authority must be granted through a
concession of legislative power, or, for example, through an
executive act, as it could be a contract between a government and a
15. See id. (noting that the commentary for article 7 elaborates on the
application of the attribution rule to certain private actors, but could have provided
more examples of the types of public functions that fall under the rule).
16. See id. at 38 (relaying the concerns of states, such as the United Kingdom
and Germany, about the lack of guidance with states' responsibility for traditional
state activities conducted by entities outside the structure of the state).
17. See id. at 39 (observing that the commentary of article 7 provides that the
attribution rule was intended to apply to private security guards employed as prison
wardens).
18. See id. at 38 (pointing to the commentary of article 7 that explains the need
for a broad term to encompass the various forms of parastatal actors).
19. See id. (stating that the commentary of article 7 discusses the difficulty of
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private entity to perform public functions.21 Likewise, doubts have
arisen about how to differentiate these entities from persons or
groups of persons that act on behalf of the State or persons that act
on the instructions or under the direction or control of the State as
provided under article 8 of 2001 ILC Draft.22
Not surprisingly, given the lack of this attribution criterion's
concrete scope, some States, such as the United Kingdom and
Germany, after seeking clearer guidance regarding an increasingly
common phenomenon, such as the parastatals represented, held that
it did not sufficiently take into account "the increasingly common
fact that States delegate to persons outside state organs activities that
are usually attributable to this. ' 23 However, the Rapporteur expressly
refused to specify the scope of the elements of governmental
authority.2 4 In his opinion, "what is considered 'public power'
depends on the society in question, its history and traditions," adding
that we are in presence of "questions of application of a general rule
to particular and various circumstances.2 5 It is for the applicant to
show that the damage actually emanates from the exercise of those
powers.26
21. See id. (noting that such criteria is not determinative when ascertaining
attribution or non-attribution of conduct involving state organs to the State itself).
22. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (commenting that he criterion included
in article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft, to the extent that it encompasses cases in which
the State delegates public functions-and not specific assignments, tasks, missions,
or orders-to private organizations or authorizes them to exercise rights under
their own sovereignty, refers to de jure agents because, in these cases, there is the
aforementioned delegation or authorization in accordance with its domestic law;
alternatively, it is more appropriate to call the individuals of whom the criterion in
article 8 is referring to agents de facto, because even such cases where a
commission may exist or in which individuals act under the direction or control, a
public and formal delegation of the state functions is normally lacking and likewise
the task or assignment does not refer to the exercise of a public prerogative or a
state function).
23. Int'l Law Comm'n, Comments and Observations Received by
Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/488 and Add. 1-3 (July 20, 1998).
24. See Special Rapporteur, First Report, supra note 14, at 39 (expressing
doubts as to whether article 7 should specifically identify the level the
"government authority" that would make an entity's actions attributable to the
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II. INITIATIVES FOR THE REGULATION OF THE
EMERGING SECTOR OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND
SECURITY COMPANIES
While supporting the abstract character that the attribution criteria
should have, some scholars uggest that the abstract character of the
attribution criteria should not prevent some allusion to the problem
currently posed by the behavior of private contractors in the
comments .27 Without prejudice to the self-regulatory efforts that are
taking place in this sector and the work of the U.N. Working Group
on this matter, the conduct of these entities is subject to the
attribution criterion contained in article 5 of the 2001 JLC Draft.2
This solution diminishes the evidentiary difficulties and has another
important consequence. It supposes that the State, when it acts
through private entities, must respond not only for their conduct in
the exercise of delegated functions, but also for the ultra vires acts.9
This solution would result in the contracting state supervising this
kind of companies' operation to a greater extent."° However, to
27. See Juste J. Ruiz, Responsabilidad internacional de los Estados y dahos al
medio ambiente: problemas de atribuci6n, en JORNADAS DE LA AsOCIACION
ESPA4OLA DE PROFESORES DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y RELACIONES
INTERNACIONALES 113, 118 (1989). Ruiz asserts that the attribution criteria:
[M]eets a formalistic legal logic, wisely dosed, that is based on a historical practice
that has hitherto little flaws. This is not surprising in any way since the construction in
question fully reflects the long-dominant schemes of legal positivism to the present
day, and the common interest of states on restricting the scope of their possible
responsibility .... The reason, interest and history thus 'shake hands' in a finished
formulation, crimped with the precision of the artist. But the proposed picture
sometime seems more responsive to the needs from the past than future ones, and their
solutions are not well-adapted to certain current realities.
Id.
28. See Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (providing that "[t]he conduct of a
person or entity which is not an organ of the state under article 4 but which is
empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements of the governmental
authority shall be considered an act of the state under international law, provided
the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance").
29. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with Commentaries, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 31, at 45, U.N. Doc.
A/56/1 0) [hereinafter 2001 Draft Articles] (elaborating that he State is responsible
for the acts of entities that are empowered to exercise aspects of state authority
even when those acts are beyond the entity's delegated authorization or contrary to
the State's instructions).
30. See id. at 43, 45 (noting that while article 5 expressly limits its authority to
entities that are "empowered by internal law" to exercise state functions, article 7
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confirm that impression, it is necessary to examine the complex
questions raised by the privatization of certain state functions.
As the doctrine has provided, one of the most innovative features
of today's armed conflicts is its submission to the privatization
process that is characteristic of globalization. At present, as Angeles
Cano Linares indicates, "the phenomenon of liberalization has
reached to the use of armed force both internally and externally so
that even the war is privatized."'" This reality comes from a gradual
process of outsourcing state activities.32 Today, private companies
provide a great variety of services and play a wide range of public
and private functions.3 The private sector's activity in this area
began with the provision of secondary services, such as infrastructure
maintenance, followed by the performance of safety and surveillance
functions over installations and military infrastructures, as well as
protection of persons or transnational corporations. However, its
activity was subsequently extended to consultancy work, logistics,
teaching, armed forces training, security or police activities, weapons
clearly makes ultra vires acts of state entities attributable to the State itself, even if
the entities acted in "excess of authority or contrary to instructions").
31. See ANGELES CANO LINARES, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO
FRENTE AL USO DE LA FUERZA COMO ACTIVIDAD EMPRESARIAL ZEL FIN DE UN
MONOPOLIO? 47 (2008); JoSt LUIS G6MEZ DEL PRADO & HELENA TORROJA
MATEU, HACIA LA REGULACION INTERNACIONAL DE LAS EMPRESAS MILITARES Y DE
SEGURIDAD PRIVADAS 18-19 (2011) (arguing that although the trend in the past two
centuries was "strengthening the legitimate use of force as a public good," this
trend has been reversed with the end of the Cold War and "the private security
industry has become a transnational phenomenon as a result of the reduction of
national armies and the globalization of the economy").
32. See, e.g., Mario A. Laborie Iglesias, La controvertida contribuci6n de las
empresas militares y de seguridad (EMSP) a la resoluci6n de conflictos, in
MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA, LOS ACTORES NO ESTATALES Y LA SEGURIDAD
INTERNACIONAL: SU PAPEL EN LA RESOLUCION DE CONFLICTOS Y CRISIS, INSTITUTO
ESPANOL DE ESTUDIos ESTRATtGICOS CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA 77, 78
(2010) (remarking that modem PMSCs originated in the 1950s and have since
provided various services to improve the efficiency of Western armies; however,
the private military and security industries have only experienced unprecedented
growth since 1990, mainly due to the need for security in weak or failed states and
the search for efficiency in developed countries).
33. E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self
Determination, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/65/325 (Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Use of
Mercenaries] (listing the functions commonly carried out by private military and
security companies, such as policing, administering prisons, protecting personnel
and convoys, intelligence collection and analysis, and interrogation of detainees).
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systems maintenance, surveillance and interrogation of detainees,
intelligence work, surveillance and reconnaissance, and even direct
participation in hostilities.34 Hence, as Jaume Saura Estapa notes, the
novelty is not so much the outsourcing of some functions of the
military field, but "the neglecting that some governments are doing
of sovereign inherent functions, such as security and use of force,
into the hands of private actors.35
However, despite the wide range of services that these entities,
generally called Private Military and Security Companies
("PMSCs"),a6 have been providing, the doctrine classifies them into
two types according to the developed activity: those that offer
security activities and those that provide military activities. Despite
this issue, as Cano Linares notes, this is a complex distinction "based
on the defensive or offensive nature of the activities, argued and
utilized by the majority of companies of this sector to defend the
need and kindness of their services, outside of the direct use of
armed force;" so that in practice, the border between the two types of
activities is "fuzzy and difficult to pinpoint."37 Logically, they are the
strictly military activities (or traditional military functions) that are
the most problematic from the point of view of international law.38
As Carlos EspaliAi Berdud notes, security activities performed by
contractors are "perfectly licit"; the only problem posed to
34. See CANO LINARES, supra note 31, at 60 (observing that private military
and security companies have diversified their services and the types of
organizations for which that they work). See generally Laborie Iglesias, supra note
32, at 87-89 (explaining the diverse functions of military and security companies).
35. Jaume Saura EstapA, Las empresas militares y de seguridadprivadas nte
el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos: su actuaci6n en el conflicto
iraqui, 19 REVISTA ELECTRONICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES, 2008, at 1
[hereinafter Saura EstapA, Las Empresas].
36. The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Human
Rights Council Res. 2005/2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.5, at 4 (Apr. 7,
2005) (defining these companies in a draft convention on PMSCs in 2010 as
"business entity providing paid military and/or security services through physical
and/or legal individuals").
37. CANo LINARES, supra note 31, at 60; see also Laborie Iglesias, supra note
32, at 78 (agreeing that distinguishing between the various types of PMSCs is
difficult because they are often interrelated).
38. CANO LINARES, supra note 31, at 61 (observing that the privatization of
military functions becomes problematic when private actors participate in abusive
practices and violations of human rights and humanitarian law).
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international law is to determine its statute from the perspective of
international humanitarian law "in the case in which, working in an
area where war is developed, they would be involved in combat,
despite of not participating in it."39 Similarly, Mario Laborie Iglesias
points out that "the fundamental point of debate affects only in
practice to activities related to military functions exclusively
conducted so far by national armies."40 That is, the author agrees that
the main drawback associated with these private entities is the
exercise of public power attributions or prerogatives, mainly, the use
of armed force." Specially, if we take into account that in the field of
military activities; there exists a growing trend of States contracting
"cowboy" companies, which receive this designation by adopting
increasingly aggressive attitudes on the ground.42
In effect, the main problem in recent years relates to the PMSCs
that provide strictly military services. This is why, at first, efforts of
the United Nations and doctrine were targeted to the approximation
of this reality to the phenomenon of mercenarism--qualifying
private contractors as new mercenaries.43 In this sense, Jose G6mez
del Prado, former president of the U.N. Working Group on
Mercenaries, and Helena Torroja Mateu, argue that "military and
private security companies are the modem reincarnation of a long
39. CARLOS ESPALIUJ BERDUD, EL ESTATUTO JURIDICO DE LOS MERCENARIOS Y
DE LAS COMPANLAS MILITARES PRIVADAS EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 57-58
(Thomson Aranzadi ed., 2007).
40. Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32, at 78.
41. See id. at 83 (contending that even the word "military," as opposed to
"civil," should only be used for regular armies and not private companies due to
the ethical and legal implications of such a label).
42. See Benjamin Perrin, Promover el cumplimiento del derecho internacional
humanitario por las empresas de seguridad y militares privadas, 88 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 307, 317 (2006) (asserting that every time the United States contracts
with a outwardly aggressive PMSC, it weakens the norms that regulate the entire
PMSC industry).
43. See COMITt INTERNACIONAL DE LA CRUZ ROJA, DOCUMENTO DE
MONTREUX 43 (2008) [hereinafter DOCUMENTO DE MONTREUX] (discussing how
PMSC personnel do not generally fit the definition of a mercenary because they
have not been recruited to fight in military operations, they are often nationals of
one of the parties to the conflict, and they are not motivated by personal gain, but
some PMSC employees can fit the definition of a mercenary and therefore they
have no right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war in international armed
conflicts).
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tradition of private contractors of war and suppliers of physical force:
privateers, buccaneers, and mercenaries."44
However, as some scholars have highlighted, despite the remote
origins of the mercenary figure and his parallelism with it, the
emergence of PMSCs and their participation in armed conflict has
now reached worrying dimensions.45 In the past two decades, we
have witnessed a spectacular development of PMSCs mainly in
developed countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom,
that provide their services especially in internal armed conflicts, low-
intensity conflict zones, and post-conflict situations, such as those in
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, the Great Lakes Region, and the
Horn of Africa.46 Moreover, as G6mez del Prado and Torroja Mateu
point out, that parallel to the privatization of war at the international
level creates an increasing demand for security services and
protection of property.47 For example, more and more transnationals
are contracting their services to mining.48
Thus, due to the wide variety of services provided by PMSCs, it is
no longer an activity exclusively intended for the States-Western or
44. G6MEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 18-19.
45. See Saura EstapA, Las Empresas, supra note 35, at 3-4 (maintaining that
the PMSC industry is sufficiently entrenched and calls to abolish the practice are
done in vain); Jorge J. Urbina, El papel de las compatiias militares y de seguridad
privadas en los conflictos armados recientes: una aproximaci6n al estatuto
juridico de su personal en el derecho internacional humanitario, en SEGURIDAD Y
DEFENSA HOY: CONSTRUYENDO EL FUTURO 141, 173 (Javier Jordin et al., eds.,
2008) (asserting that PMSCs provide their users many advantages and benefits: (1)
greater specialization, (2) prompt action, (3) overcome limitations and
responsibilities, (4) advantages in operations area by recruiting staff from the local
population, and (5) lower cost); Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32, at 97-102
(analyzing the benefits that PMSCs offer to their users, but concluding that the
growth of this industry has led to ethical and legal questions).
46. See Use of Mercenaries, supra note 33, at 4 (finding that privatization of
security is intensifying and mostly driven by the United States and the United
Kingdom, which supplies and contracts the majority of private military and
security companies).
47. H.R.C. Res. 2005/2, supra note 36, at 2 (recognizing the demand for
private mercenaries on the global market due to increased instability and conflicts).
48. E.g., GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 17-19
(observing that the illegal extraction of natural resources in conflict zones creates a
demand for PMSCs).
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weak.49 These private entities have strongly spread across the market
providing their services to different clients from opposition groups,
national resistance movements, criminal organizations, multinational
corporations, individuals, non-governmental organizations that carry
out humanitarian activities, and even international intergovernmental
organizations such as the United Nations.5" As Laborie Iglesias
notes, "in an unstoppable growth trend, PMSCs have now become
essential actors to when understanding the current context of
international security."51
As previously noted, given the existing proximity between
mercenaries and PMSC employees, initial efforts were directed
toward elaborating a broader definition of a mercenary or adapting
the notion of a mercenary to deal with the new reality.2 The
proximity between the two figures is easily apprehensible because it
is possible to describe the mercenaries as "soldiers for hire"
inasmuch as "instead of fighting for their own country they offer
their services to governments and groups from other countries for a
49. See Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32, at 133-34. Remarking that PMSCs
thrive because
On the one hand, in weak or failed states, governments are unable to exercise the
monopoly of the use of armed force. Rebel movements, insurgents, terrorists, pirates,
warlords, ethnic or tribal militias and organized crime movements fill the vacuum
created by the inability of states. The governments of these countries and especially
transnational corporations who operate there, contract PMSC services to continue their
productive activity. On the other hand, Western states have suffered 'neoliberal'
transformations due to globalization and trade liberalization. Western armed forces
have also been affected by the privatization waves which, carried out in the name of
efficiency, have affected all economic sectors.
50. See G6MEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 20 (referring
to a U.N. contract with a British PMSC to send security personnel to the U.N.
mission in Afghanistan); see also Grupo de Trabajo inicia estudio sobre
compahias de seguridad privadas usadas por la ONU, CENTRO DE NOTICIAS DE LA
ONU (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.un.org/spanish/News/story.asp?NewslD=2596
2#.VSMlcUKYlzp (reporting that the Working Group announced it would carry
out of a study on the use of PMSCs by U.N. organizations and expects to submit
the report to the General Assembly in 2014 to enable developing a coherent policy
on the matter).
51. Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32, at 78.
52. See U.N. Comisi6n de Derechos Humanos, Repercusiones de las
actividades de los mercenarios sobre el derecho de los pueblos a la libre
determinaci6n (1987), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Fact
Sheet28sp.pdf (tracing the evolution of the definition of "mercenary" and
concluding that some of today's PMSCs are seen as a new form of the familiar
label).
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substantial monetary compensation," as the U.N.'s Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights study on the impact of
mercenaries' activities demonstrates.53 However, the existing legal
definition in international law requires the concurrence of a number
of cumulative requirements for a person's qualification as a
mercenary.54 The need of cumulative compliance of each and every
one of the conditions required poses, the problem that:
[I]n practice it will be very difficult to find a person who can be qualified
as a mercenary .... It is very complicated for one State to show that a
person receives a salary for his military services when payment is carried
out in the mercenary's country of origin or in a bank account of a third
State. 
55
Moreover, as the doctrine has been noting, it is necessary to
provide a specific and adequate answer to this phenomenon because
of the dimension that the war-privatization phenomenon is
reaching.56 However, as Saura Estapa notes, whether or not to
include new contractors in the definition of "technical notion" of
mercenaries is a crucial question in many aspects, especially relating
to the suitable application of the rights and obligations under
53. Id. at 4-5.
54. See id. at 17-18 (listing the concurring requirements that define a
mercenary: (1) specifically recruited to fight in an armed conflict; (2) participates
directly in combat; (3) motivated by private gain that is promised to be
substantially higher than that paid to similar combatants in the armed forces of a
party to the conflict; (4) not a national or resident of a party to the conflict; (5) not
a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; (6) not sent on official duty
as a member of the armed forces of a State that is not party to the conflict).
55. ESPALfI BERDUD, supra note 39, at 47-48 (noting that the frequent
recourse to PMSCs with the nationality of the contracting state is that most of its
members elude to the requirement of citizenship referred to in the international
instruments on mercenaries).
56. See CANO LINARES, supra note 31, at 47 (maintaining that "the various
features that differentiate the current reality in respect of the historic phenomenon
make extremely difficult that the solution could be reduced to the current
criminalization procedure with the modification/extension of the concept of
mercenary nowadays in force"); Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32, at 136-37
(advocating a specific regulation of PMSCs on the premise that "the discussion
concerning whether these companies are or are not a new form of mercenary, is
completely useless. Open hiring of these private services by democratic
governments gives a great deal of legitimacy to PMSCs... Therefore, it seems
crucial to regulate the activities of private security companies as an entirely
different matter in respect of mercenarism.").
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international humanitarian law. " However, from the broader point of
view of respecting human rights, this is a relatively minor issue.8
Indeed, it is a good position because it is crucial to determine the
obligations of the contractors, as well as the distinct types of
responsibilities that may arise from acts contrary to international
human rights law. 19
With regard to the efforts in establishing a regulatory framework
for PMSCs in the early 1980s, the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights focused on the role of mercenaries in relation to the principle
of self-determination of peoples.6" Subsequently, the initial mandate
was extended to generally cover the repercussions of PMSC
activities upon realizing human rights.61 As evidenced in the work of
57. Saura EstapA, Las Empresas, supra note 35, at 5.
58. Id. (noting that it is irrelevant whether employees of PMSCs respond to the
technical label of "mercenaries," unless certain conditions, such as whether their
actions constitute a violation of generally recognized human rights standards,
apply).
59. See Comit6 Internacional de la Cruz Roja, El Derecho Internacional
Humanitario y Los Desaflos en Los Conflictos Armados Contempordneos, at 32-
34, 30IC/07/8.4 (Nov. 26-30, 2007). In its report, the ICRC Committee conveys
that PMSC staff do not have a specific status in international humanitarian law
because:
PMCs/PSCs are private companies. Although INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW is binding on non-state actors, this is only to the extent that they are parties in an
armed conflict (i.e., organized armed groups). As legal entities, private companies are
not bound by INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, contrary to what happens
with his staff who, as individuals, must be ruled by international humanitarian law in
situations of armed conflict. People who work for private companies in armed conflict
have rights and obligations under INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, but
there is no particular statute that covers all employees. The status of each individual
depends on the specific situation where that person acts and the functions assumed"
because in the field of international armed conflicts, PMSC staff can be located in any
of the following categories: i) members of the armed forces; ii) militias or other
volunteer bodies; iii) individuals who follow the armed forces.
Id.
60. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/34 (Dec. 4,
1989) ("[S]tates parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries for the
purpose of opposing the legitimate exercise of the inalienable right of peoples to
self-determination").
61. E.g., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and
the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, at 34 (Nov. 28, 2007)
[hereinafter Red Cross Conference Report] (examining several international
initiatives for developing standards for PMSCs to ensure their compliance with
international humanitarian and human rights law).
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the Working Group and as some scholars have been pointing out, as
well as the need for a regulatory framework for the activities of these
private companies, the basic underlying problem is whether state
functions relating to the use of force can be performed by private
entities.62 In other words, the debate centers on the role of the State
as a monopoly holder of legitimate force.63
However, parallel to the work within the United Nations and
emerging studies on the subject within the framework of the Council
of Europe and the European Union,64 there have been increasing
attempts to self-regulate in recent years.65 Along with the ethical
codes by which PMSCs try to regulate themselves, the most
important instrument is known as the Montreux Document, adopted
in response to an initiative launched in 2005 by the Swiss
Government with International Committee of the Red Cross
("ICRC") as a co-sponsor.66 Indeed, besides the codes of ethics or
conduct subscribed within PMSC associations or lobbies, seventeen
States adopted the Montreux Document on Pertinent International
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States regarding the
Operations of Military and Private Security Companies during
Armed Conflicts67 on September 17th, 2008.68 It played an important
62. E.g., CANO LINARES, supra note 31, at 76 (contending that PMSCs must
be regulated at the industry, national, and international levels).
63. See Red Cross Conference Report, supra note 60, at 33 (asserting that as
the presence of private military companies ("PMCs") continues to grow, most
challenges against PMSCs focus on the legitimacy of States outsourcing their
military functions and whether States should be restricted from transferring their
monopoly of force to the private sector); see also Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32,
at 106-07 (questioning the role that the State should play with regard to its position
as guarantor of the monopoly of force).
64. E.g., GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 18-19
(describing the Council of Europe's regional initiative to regulate PMSCs).
65. Id. at 37-60 (describing the efforts in the United States to regulate
PMSCs); Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32, at 128-29 (referring to the code of
conduct created by the PMSC lobby group, International Peace Operations
Association); e.g., Pilar Pozo Serrano & Lourdes Hernndez Martin, El marco
juridico de las CMSP: reflexiones a prop6sito de la experiencia en Irak, 23
ANUARIO ESPA&OL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 315, 348-49 (2007) (relaying the
self-regulatory initiatives carried in the United States by the PMSC industry).
66. See Red Cross Conference Report, supra note 60, at 34 (recounting that
the creation of the Montreux Document involved the participation of governments,
industry representatives, academics, and nongovernmental organizations).
67. DOCUMENTO DE MONTREUX, supra note 43.
68. See Participating States of the Montreux Document, SwIss FED. DEP'T OF
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role in the drafting process of the Document that both non-
governmental organizations and companies within the sector
participating in the process.69
The main objective of this instrument, which has no binding legal
value as its text specified,7" is promoting respect for international
human rights law in the context of the operations of PMSCs in
situations of armed conflict.7' Now, this text is limited to reiterating
the international obligations of the States, PSMCs, and their
personnel in accordance with international human rights72 and to
establish the "best practices" that companies should follow while
offering a series of instructions that signatory states must follow to
help those companies adapt their practices to the existing legal
obligations.73 In this sense, Gomez Del Prado and Torroja Mateu are
right to assert the need to integrate "best practices" in a binding
instrument because regrettably, "the experience shows that, left to
FOREIGN AFFAIRs, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/
international-law.. .ian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-
states.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2015) (noting the fifty-one state signatories to the
agreement, including the seventeen states that participated in the drafting process:
Afghanistan, Germany, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, Qatar, China, United
States, France, Iraq, Poland, United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine were the original signatories, and Albania,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Ecuador, Slovenia, Spain, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Jordan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Macedonia, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal,
Uganda, and Uruguay have joined afterwards).
69. See G6MEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 53 (relaying
the Working Group's sentiment that PMSC industry groups played a significant
role in drafting the Montreux Document).
70. See DOCUMENTO DE MONTREUX, supra note 43, at 9 (stating that the
instrument does not possess a binding character and therefore does not affect the
international rules and obligations applicable to the States).
71. See Permanent Representative of Switz., Status of the Protocols Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Armed Conflicts, at 3, transmitted by Letter to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/63/467-S/2008/636 (Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Status of the Protocols]
(proclaiming that the Montreux Document contains a list of over seventy good
practices designed to guide States that employ PMSCs in complying with
international humanitarian law and human rights).
72. See Red Cross Conference Report, supra note 60, at 34 (maintaining that
the Montreux Document reaffirms existing legal obligations in relation to PMSCs
operating or egistered in a State's jurisdiction).
73. See id. at 34.
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self-regulation, do not usually apply the best practices when they are
only models to follow."74
This instrument has been completed by an International Code of
Conduct for Private Security Services Providers and signed on
November 9th, 201075 at the initiative of the private industry itself,
once again counting on the support of the Swiss Government7 6 As
indicated in the 2011 ICRC report, the objective was developing a
code of conduct that "systematizes the principles, so that private
security services providers can operate in accordance with the norms
of international humanitarian law and international law of human
rights."77 The initial idea is that the Code has two distinct parts: first,
concerning the rules of conduct, management, and governance; and
second, establishing an international governance and oversight
mechanism to ensure Code compliance by signed private entities."
Despite its realism, the doctrine is incorrect in its assessment of the
Swiss Initiative, when it predicts that everything seems to indicate
that the Swiss Initiative is condemned to a deadlock; however, it
should not be so.79
74. GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 51.
75. See International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers,
CONFEDERATION SUISSE 3 (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
INTERNATIONALCODEOFCONDUCTSPA.pdf (committing the sixty
signatory companies-joined later by several more-to respect the human rights
and humanitarian responsibilities of their personnel, clients, suppliers,
shareholders, and the population of the territories in which they operate).
76. See id. (endorsing the principles of the Montreux Document and the rule of
law).
77. Red Cross Conference Report, supra note 60, at 35.
78. See id. (claiming that the drafters' proposed second part to International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, providing for an
international oversight mechanism, has yet to be integrated into the Code); see also
Chairperson of the U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on
the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/21/43 (Jul. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Report] (relaying
the Working Group's observations of the Draft Statute of the Mechanism of
Supervision Code, submitted by the Provisional Steering Committee of the
International Code of Conduct for Suppliers of Private Security Service on January
16, 2012).
79. G6MEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 60; see also
Human Rights Council Report, supra note 77, at 17 (concluding that the Working
Group welcomes self-regulating efforts, such as the Montreux Document and the
Code of Conduct for Suppliers of Private Security Service, but requests that States
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Relating to the work of the Working Group, since its inception and
in the exercise of its functions, the United Nations has recommended
a set of general rules and principles and a draft of a possible
convention on private military and security companies.8" Some of the
issues covered in this draft convention deserve to be noted although
Western states, where this new industry has emerged, are not
supporting efforts to regulate this sector.81 Eighty percent of existing
PMSCs are established in the United Kingdom and the United
States. 82
The existence of this binding instrument must be considered
necessary to regulate and control PMSC activities.83 The main reason
for supporting the drafting of a binding legal instrument to regulate
and control PMSCs is to address the existing difficulties to require
and make effective the different responsibilities that may arise from
understand these initiatives as complementary, rather than substitutes for
international and national regulatory frameworks).
80. See Chairperson of the U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights
and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, at 20,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (Jul. 2, 2010) (aiming to create a binding instrument
establishing minimum international standards for state regulation of PMSCs and
their personnel); Use of Mercenaries, supra note 33, at 16-17 (recommending the
adoption of an international legal instrument regulating PMSCs and encouraging
States to participate in the Human Rights Council Working Group tasked with
creating a new convention on this issue).
81' See GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 139
(discussing the various reasons that States rejected a conventional mechanism of
regulation and control of PMSC activities: (1) the incompetence of the Human
Rights Council, arguing that it is a matter for the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly because it is where the relationships between different branches of
international law, such as international criminal law, international humanitarian
law, and state responsibility law are studied; and (2) the existence of private
initiatives for the regulation of the sector outside the United Nations, like the Swiss
Initiative with the Montreux Document and other initiatives of the European Union
and Council of Europe).
82. Jos6 L. G6mez del Prado, Private Military and Security Companies and
the U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 429,
438 (2008) (remarking that regulation of PMSCs in the United States and United
Kingdom seems to have been left up to the "invisible hand of the market").
83. See G.A. Res. 67/159, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/67/159 (Feb. 26, 2013)
(expressing the General Assembly's conviction that a legally binding,
comprehensive, and international instrument must be adopted to ensure PMSCs are
held accountable for human rights violations).
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the actions of these private entities.14 From the perspective of the
international responsibility of the contracting state, it would be
possible for the attribution of conduct PMSCs. However, the
contracting state is not the only one that may incur international
responsibility. At the same time, the other existing gaps, mainly
regarding the responsibility of companies themselves, must be
filled.85 As evidenced by the reports of the Working Group, there
exist many allegations of grave human rights violations committed
by PMSC employees, ranging from summary executions to acts
against the people's right of self-determination, through a series of
complaints about acts of torture, arbitrary detention, human-
trafficking, among others. 
86
The draft convention regulating PMSCs specifies the general
principles guiding the work of the U.N. Working Group. The text
aspires to establish basic and minimum international norms for the
regulation of the sector. 87 In other words, in the event that it becomes
an international treaty, the States and international organizations
would be faced with a series of primary rules that are applicable to
all situations, independently of being or not defined as an armed
conflict.88 Their object and purpose is, on one hand, to prohibit the
84. See Urbina, supra note 45, at 173 (asserting that a legal framework for
PMSCs must regulate the actions of PMSC personnel and should establish
mechanisms to control the functions of such companies, assure transparency, and
provide for individual and collective liability for abuses of human rights and
international humanitarian law).
85. See Comit& Internacional de la Cruz Roja, supra note 59, at 31 (remarking
that PMSCs are not acting in a legal vacuum, as some critics argue, because their
employees are bound by the rules of international human rights and humanitarian
law, but in practice it becomes almost impossible to implement the rules due to the
unwillingness or inability of the States and other stakeholders).
86. See H.R.C. Res. 2005/2, supra note 36, at 4 (citing concern that terrorism,
arms trafficking, and covert operations may encourage mercenaries to participate
in activities designed to impede the right to self-determination and the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states).
87. See Red Cross Conference Report, supra note 61, at 35 (recounting that
the Working Group reported back to the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2010 on
the basic elements of a proposed international convention to regulate PMSCs).
88. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Draft
International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private
Military and Security Companies 8 (Jul. 13, 2009), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
issues/mercenaries/docs/A.HRC. 15.25.pdf [hereinafter Draft International
Convention on Private Military and Security Companies] (establishing that the
proposed convention would apply to States, intergovernmental organizations, and
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delegation and/or contract of inherent duties to the State, such as the
use of armed force by the PMSC, to ensure the respect and
effectiveness of human rights.89 In fact, the highlight of the draft
convention is the recommendation about the prohibition of
outsourcing of inherent state functions to PMSCs, in coherence with
the principle that the State is the sole holder of the monopoly of the
use to force.9" On the other hand, the object and purpose is to
establish a system to limit, control, and supervise the performance of
PMSCs and also to punish the violations committed by contracts.9'
In accordance with the above, the general principles guiding the
proposed convention seems clear: (1) to reiterate the fundamental
precept of the monopoly of force of the States; (2) to reaffirm the
States' obligations to secure the respect for international
humanitarian law and international human rights law by PMSCs; (3)
to define those functions that should be inherent o the States and can
neither be left in private hands nor externalized;92(4) to propose
normative systems, both internationally and nationally, creating a
registration and licensing mechanism for PMSCs; (5) to establish an
independent international committee composed of fourteen members
that oversee the implementation of the convention while monitoring
PMSCs' activities; and (6) provide a compensation system for
potential victims of abusive actions committed by these security
companies by creating an international compensation fund for
victims with a subsidiary character.93
non-state actors, including PMSCs and their personnel).
89. See id. at 5-6 (reciting that the purpose of the proposed convention is to
reassert and promote States' responsibility for the use of force and address the
challenges that PMSCs pose to the fully implementing human rights obligations).
90. See id. (declaring that some military and security functions are inherently
governmental under international law and cannot be outsourced).
91. See id. (averring the need for a monitoring mechanism to regulate the
licensing and activities of PMSCs).
92. See GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 101
(advocating for the establishment of a strong core of non-delegable functions,
delimiting the content of the use of armed force in its technical sense, rather than
regulating the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of armed force in
international relations that concerns the illicit use of force between the states).
93. See Draft International Convention on Private Military and Security
Companies, supra note 87, arts. 15, 29, 32. See generally G6MEZ DEL PRADO &
TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 93-134 (reviewing the content of the Draft
Convention).
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III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES
FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED BY PRIVATE
CONTRACTORS
This section addresses issues relating to the international
responsibility of the State in accordance with the regulations
examined, including the Montreux Document and the draft
convention relating to the States concerned, including the contracting
state, the state of operations, and the state of origin.94 Regarding the
Contracting State, the first paragraph of the Montreux Document
states that: "Contracting States are bound by obligations imposed on
them under international law, although they contract PMSCs to
perform certain activities."95 It is therefore a reminder of the State's
international obligations, particularly those derived from
international humanitarian law. However, with respect to the
attributive issues, the seventh paragraph provides that:
Notwithstanding the fact that to establish contractual relations with
PMSCs does not involve by itself the responsibility of the Contracting
States, they are responsible for violations of international humanitarian
law, human rights standards, or other rules of international law committed
by PMSCs or their personnel when those violations are attributable to the
Contracting State in accordance with customary international law. 96
94. See Use of Mercenaries, supra note 33, at 20 (observing that the terms
used in the draft convention referring to the involved states are very similar to
those employed in the Montreux Document with some variation; for instance,
contracting states are those that "directly contract PMSC services, including, where
appropriate, when that company subcontracts their services with another PMSC or
when a PMSC operates through its affiliated companies (draft convention, art.
20)); the states of operations (referred to as "Territorial State" in the Montreux
Document) are "the states in whose territory a PMSC operates" (draft convention,
art. 2(k)); the State of Origin refers to "states whose nationality bears the PMSC"
or put differently the States in which they are registered or have established
companies; if the state in which a PMSC is registered is not the same as their
principal office directives are located, the State of Origin will be the state in which
such offices are found (draft convention, art. 2(1)); and, finally, third-party states
are "states other than the Contracting States, or origin, or of operation, whose
nationals are employed as employees of a PMSC" (draft convention, art. 2(m)).
95. Status of the Protocols, supra note 71, at 7.
96. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). According to customary international law, the
Swiss Permanent Representative concluded that "the imputation to the Contracting
State" will take place:
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The most notable-although predictable feature-of this
regulatory initiative is the intent to minimize the contracting state's
responsibility, explicitly excluding the consideration of the contract
as a way of delegating or assigning public functions to PMSCs.97
Unlike these provisions, the draft agreement is a reminder of the
implicated States' international obligations whose violation leads to
their international accountability and at the same time the delegation
is equated with the hiring.98
Indeed, the most important precepts from the perspective of the
State's responsibility are articles 4 and 9 of the draft.99 Article 4's
first paragraph establishes the "responsibility for military and
security activities of PMSCs" for the state of origin and the state of
operations, whether or not they hired them, thus pointing to the
States' obligations to watch and supervise the PMSCs' activities.100
As G6mez del Prado and Torroja Mateu point out in their comments
on this provision, the wording of this provision relies on the premise
that the draft agreement does not aim to address the problem relating
[P]articularly if PMSCs personnel: a) have been incorporated to the state as regular
armed forces, in accordance with their national legislation; b) are members of forces,
units or armed groups under a command responsible to the state; c) are empowered to
exercise public authority prerrogatives if they act in such quality (i.e., if they are
officially authorized by law or by some other rule to perform functions that are
normally carried out by state organs); or d) they act following state instructions (i.e., if
the state has given specific instructions regarding the conduct of the private agent), or
following their directives or under their control (i.e., if the state actually exercises
effective control over the private agent's conduct).
Id.
97. See id. (attributing responsibility to the contracting state for violating
international law committed by a state-sanctioned PMSC exercising elements of
governmental authority).
98. See GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 114
(discussing three specific prohibitions: direct participation in hostilities, terrorist
acts, and a ban on military actions that are only prohibited when pursuing one of
the objectives listed in article 9 (the closed list), such as the overthrow of the
government or undermining the constitutional order or the legal, economic, and
financial basis of the state; the modification, by coercion, of internationally
recognized borders; the violation of sovereignty or the support of the foreign
occupation of part or all the territory of the State; and the deliberate attacks against
civilians or disproportionate damages, such as those that are contained in an open
list of examples).
99. See Draft Articles, supra note 1, arts. 4, 9.
100. See id. art. 4 (establishing the States' strict liability for actions of any state
organ, regardless of its function, position within the state structure, or jurisdiction).
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to the attribution of the State's conduct, considering the 2001 ILC
draft governs this issue.1°1 Thus, the purpose of including this
provision is to highlight the obligation imposed on the country of
origin and operation-whether they coincide or not with the
Contracting State-to regulate, supervise, and control the activities
of PMSCs. 102 As these scholars note, "it could be a concretion of the
general duty of prevention that the States have: preventing acts
committed under their jurisdiction that may cause harm to other
States or to the international community at large."103 Likewise, in the
second paragraph of the same precept, an obligation expressly
directed to the contracting state is collected, oriented to guarantee the
instruction of PMSCs staff on international standards and their
respect, thus extending to private contractors the international
obligation placed on States respective to their organs and persons
acting under its effective control. 104
However, the main difference with the Montreux Document is the
equalization that is made in article 9 of the draft agreement between
delegation and engagement. 105 Notwithstanding the fact that the draft
agreement does not aim to examine questions relating to the
attribution of conduct to the State, the equalization that is carried out
favors the interpretation that the suitability of the application of
article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft in these cases.0 6 It is possible to
attribute the PMSC conduct to the contracting state to determine its
international responsibility when public functions are delegated to
101. GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 111 (arguing
that the text of the ILC Draft uses the terminology "state responsibility for the use
of force," in reference to the principle implicit in article 1.1 of the Convention,
which addresses trengthening state accountability with regard to the use of force
and emphasizing the significance of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force).
102. Id. (noting that the generic prohibition on the delegation or contracting of
the use of force under article 9 eventually became linked to the principle of state
monopoly on the legitimate use of force).
103. Id.atllO-11.
104. See id. (commenting that the second paragraph also establishes the States'
obligation to adopt legislative measures concerning procedures for contracting and
subcontracting PMSCs, forwarding export and import licenses for personnel and
services, and effective customs controls for firearms used by PMSCs).
105. See, e.g., Use of Mercenaries, supra note 33, at 4 (prohibiting delegation
of state functions).
106. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (holding that an act by a non-state party
authorized to act by a State shall be considered a state act under international law).
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those companies, even though an act of the executive (contract)
delegates the public function, as often happens in practice. 107 Indeed,
article 9 of the draft convention intends to "[p]rohibit[] ... the
delegation or outsourcing of the inherent duties to the State."
Although its purpose is to prohibit States from delegating or
contracting the development of inherently state functions to PMSCs,
the article uses the disjunctive "or" when it refers to the way in
which the attribution can take place, equating delegation and
engagement. 108
In this way, the Montreux Document seems to deliberately stress
the international obligations incumbent on the territorial state and the
state of origin, and consequently the international responsibility
derived from the PMSCs' actions, to the detriment of the
international responsibility of the contracting state. 109 In contrast, the
main novelty of the draft convention in the context of primary rules
is to extend to contractors the general obligation of instruction on
international standards incumbent on States over their own organs. II0
Nevertheless, because the proposed convention also attempts to
establish international obligations for concerned states different from
the contracting state, an extension for the state of origin of the
international obligations incumbent on the territorial State and the
establishment of primary obligations in relation to that State is
necessary. Such international obligations can be an incentive to
minimize the risk of infringement by PMSC employees and
ultimately the most undesirable consequences of this phenomenon. 11
107. See Use of Mercenaries, supra note 33, at 22 (mandating each party define
and limit the scope and activities of PMSCs).
108. Id. at 22 (providing that attribution may occur as the result of "hostilities,
terrorist acts and military actions aimed at, or which states have grounds for
suspecting would result in the overthrow of a government; the coercive change of
internationally acknowledged borders of the state; the violation of sovereignty;
explicitly targeting civilians or causing disproportionate harm").
109. DOCUMENTO DE MONTREUX, supra note 43, at 13 (mandating that States
retain obligations under international law even if they contract PMSCs).
110. Use of Mercenaries, supra note 33, at 21 (providing instructions for
mandatory instructions of PMSCs in international human rights and international
humanitarian law).
111. See Perrin, supra note 42, at 312 (noting that States obey international law
when it suits their short or long-term interests; the States where PMSCs are
constituted "will guarantee respect for [international humanitarian law] when
convenient for its reputation" and "[t]here is clear evidence that national regulatory
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Even though acts committed by PMSC personal theoretically
should be attributed to the contracting state under article 5 of the
2001 ILC Draft, the territorial state is still bound by its international
obligations. Moreover, the territorial state has the duty to establish
basic standards, such that the state of origin may regulate the activity
of PMSC personnel in the event of a breach. Likewise, a breach
would trigger both the international obligations of the territorial state
or the state of origin and the contracting state.112 That is, the
attribution of the conduct of PMSCs to the contracting state would
require qualifying the act of the contractors as an act of the State,
regardless of eventual international responsibility that might arise in
relation to the other implicated States in the case that at the same
time it was proved that they have violated their international
obligations."3 In particular, the Territorial State could engage
responsibility for infringement of their obligations of preventing and/
or repressing the acts of contractors and the State of Origin for
violating their obligations to control and supervise the PMSCs. 1
4
After examining these attempts of positive regulation and
regarding attributive issues, according to the jurisprudence and state
practice, the question arises who is responsible for responding to the
infractions committed by PMSC employees? However, the
contracting of a PMSC service is not prohibited by international law,
authority is launched when there are allegations of improper conduct by PMSCs
abroad. South Africa was subjected to international pressure in order to control
notorious companies based in that country (especially Executive Outcomes) which
lead to the adoption of the Law on Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance in
1998"; accordingly, States of Origin will have an economic interest in promoting
the perception that private entities registered in their territory are lawful; however,
this author considers that i should not overestimate the strength of this incentive
since the same is based on "the presumption that 'bad' PMSCs are not profitable"
which is refuted in his study).
112. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (describing non-state acts as acts under
international law when supported by state).
113. Perrin, supra note 42, at 317 (offering holding states responsible for PMSC
acts in situations as a counterbalance to the risk of "othering").
114. Id. (asserting that when State where the PMSC operates-the Territorial
State-is different from the Contracting State, the conduct of PMSC personnel
should be viewed as behavior of private individuals, without prejudice to any
international responsibility for violating their obligations of preventing and/or
suppressing on part of the state organs with respect to the acts committed by
contractors).
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even though this may not lead to a transfer of responsibility,115 as is
currently the case. Moreover, this is a complex matter and the
international responsibility of the state for the conduct of private
contractors remains a controversial issue. 116
Despite this, concluding that in cases in which States enter into
contracts with PMSCs and their employees carry out the functions of
the State, such as engaging in hostilities, the State is completely
irresponsible for the conduct of the persons that, according to its own
decision, perform its functions.117 This is why the criterion
recognized in article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft acquires a clear
relevance in these cases."' Its application would involve the
attribution to the State of the conduct carried out by the persons and
entities that perform public functions.119 Moreover, if as Benjamin
Perrin notes, taking into account one of the causes of contracting
PMSC services is to gain distance from contracted tasks, "political or
even legally", because such tasks are occasionally "inappropriate or
unpopular." 120
Perrin, following criminologists like Ruth Jamieson and Kieran
McEvoy, maintains that "States try to mask their responsibility for
state crimes outsourcing both perpetrators and victims."'12 1 In the
same line, as Perrin rightly maintains, following the political scientist
P.W. Singer, "a key risk of PMSCs is that they allow governments to
115. See Carsten Hoppe, Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private
Military Companies, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 989, 1014 (2008) (providing that States
are free under international law to outsource functions in armed conflict, such as
guarding and protection, interrogation, or even combat, which formerly were in the
exclusive domain of soldiers, although they are not free to "pass the buck" with
respect to responsibility).
116. See Laborie Iglesias, supra note 32, at 78 (identifying the lack of an
obligation for PMSCs to justify their actions and be subjected to legal
consequences by authorities as the principal problem associated with private
security and military forces).
117. Antonio Pastor Palomar, Blackwater ante el Derecho internacional: el
negocio de la inmunidad, 60 REVISTA ESPA4OLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
426, 430 (2008) (stating that contracting state functions to private military groups
cannot be used to circumvent international law).
118. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (attributing international law to PMSCs
supported by States).
119. Id. (noting that this provision is limited to circumstances where the person
or entity is exercising elements of the governmental authority).
120. Perrin, supra note 42, at 316.
121. Id. at 312, 316 (internal quotations omitted).
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perform actions that would otherwise not be possible, as they would
not receive legislative or public approval."12 Therefore, no doubt
exists that the "combination of the dependence of PMSCs to do the
'dirty work' and the elimination of democratic oversight is a
worrying prospect, which increases the risks of [international
humanitarian law] violations."'
123
The main reason why the drafters included the current article 5 in
the 2001 ILC Draft focuses on the nature of the role played, as
opposed to what happens in article 8, where the nature of the
function is not decisive and the decisive factor is the relationship or
existing link.'24 The feature that characterizes the individuals or
entities referred in that article is empowering individuals and entities
to perform certain functions that the state organs assume as a general
rule.'25 In other words, the basis of attribution criterion contained in
article 5 of the ILC Draft 2001 is the State delegating its own
functions and individuals consequently exercising those functions. 26
When at the end of the last century, James Crawford studied this
criterion, he acknowledged that an increasing number of parastate
entities exercise government functions. At the same time, he justified
maintaining the term entity by its amplitude in order to include both
public institutions and private law firms.'27 All this, without
prejudice to the observations of some governments, such as
Yugoslavia,'28 proposing a clause in the draft that defined what
should be understood by an "entity which exercise[s] elements of
public governance," a proposal that was rejected by the Rapporteur.
122. P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 119 (2005) (citing Perrin,
supra note 42, at 312, 316) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Perrin, supra note 42, at 312, 317; see also CANO LINARES, supra note 31.
124. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 8 (describing laws where a person is
acting on instructions of or under direction or control of the state).
125. Id. (considering an act to be a state act when a person's action is under
control of the State).
126. Draft Articles, supra note 1, arts. 5, 8 (regulating actors who are not state
organs but exercise elements of government authority).
127. See Special Rapporteur, First Report, supra note 14, at 38 (arguing that the
term "entity" is wide enough to cover a range of bodies).
128. Observations and Comments of Governments, supra note 12 (noting
government commentaries and observations advocating for placing article 8 after
articles 9 and 10).
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Despite problems with delegating or authorizing the exercise of
public function in favor of these entities, it is possible to conclude
from Crawford's comments that the distinction between individuals
whose conduct fall under the article 5 criterion and individuals
whose conduct should be classified under article 8 is that the
delegation of authority or authorization shall be in accordance to the
law of the State."2 9 Thus, this formula covers contracts between the
State and PMSC, with or without the intervention of legislative
power, through which a concrete public function or prerogative is
entrusted, such as the use of force. If this authorization exists even by
contract, then article 5 should be the basis of attribution without
resorting to the criterion contained in article 8 of the 2001 LLC
Draft. 130
Accordingly, under the attribution criterion and the formula
endorsed in article 5 of the ILC Draft, there are three requirements:
(1) entity empowered by the internal law of the State (de jure link);
(2) authorized to exercise prerogatives of public authority (functional
criterion); and (3) the conduct has been committed when the person
or group of persons acted in that capacity, which is similar to the
established requirement relating to the state organs in article 4 of the
2001 ILC Draft Convention.' Thus, unlike the consequences in
relation to the armed forces in the field of international humanitarian
law, 32 under general international law, the attribution of the conduct
129. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (clarifying that actors are empowered by
the law of that State).
130. See, e.g., James Crawford, Human Rights and State Responsibility,
Address at the 12th Raymond & Beverly Sackler Distinguished Lecture Series at
the University of Connecticut's Thomas J. Dodd Research Centre (Oct. 25, 2006)
(using the verb contract to refer to the form of delegation or attribution of public
functions under the criterion contained in article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft and
maintaining that "[a] non-state actor might be engaged by the state to 'exercise
elements of the governmental authority'; where this is the case, conduct of the non-
state actor may be attributed to the state. According to ARSIWA Article 5" and
indicating that: "[t]here are various situations in which non-state actors are agents
of a state; for example, in recent years, in some countries, public bodies have
contracted with private security firms to take over the management of prisons; this
is an example of a private party acting as an agent of the state, a situation in which
its acts will be attributed to the state for international law purposes").
131. Draft Articles, supra note 1, arts. 4-5 (providing that the conduct of any
state organ should be considered an act of the state under international law
pursuant to article 4).
132. Marco Sassbli, La responsabilidad el Estado por las violaciones del
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is excluded when contractors acts in a private capacity. It could be
argued that these requisites may be considered satisfied in cases
where a State delegates its typical functions to a PMSC and its
contractors, acting in the exercise of this functions, commit acts that
can be qualified as international wrongful acts.
However, as Perrin rightly notes, "the responsibility of the State
largely remains a theoretical question, and has been rarely invoked in
practice."133 Indeed, the logical reasoning that is possible on a
theoretical level is not, however, applicable in practice.
Unfortunately, despite its consecration in the coding work of the ILC
and its invocation by the Intemational Court of Justice ("ICJ") when
it examines questions relating to the attribution of the conduct to the
State,134 the attribution criteria under article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft
seems only apply to very specific cases and face serious problems of
application when applied to the actions of PMSCs.135 Multiple
reasons explain this reality.
A. THE PMSC: THE EXISTENCE OF AN INVOLVED THIRD PARTY
First, the existence of an involved third party (the PMSC). In the
ordinary cases when the state organs act, there are two
responsibilities that may coexist: the state responsibility and the
individual one.'36 However, when the State delegates their functions
derecho internacional humanitario, COMITt INTERNACIONAL DE LA CRUz ROJA
(June 30, 2002), https://www.icrc.org/spa/resources/documents/misc/5tecbx.htm
(stating that, in accordance with article 3 of the Regulations concerning the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907,
the State is responsible for the acts performed by persons that form part of their
armed forces in violation of this rules, regardless of whether they had acted in such
quality or privately; this special provision relating to attribution was subsequently
included in article 91 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949 (Protocol I), adopted in 1977, which establishes that aparty to the
conflict "shall be responsible for all the acts committed by persons that form part
of their armed forces;" this provides a clear example of lex specialis in the field of
the attribution rules).
133. Perrin, supra note 42, at 317.
134. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 226, 242 (Dec. 19) (examining whether
actions were under instructions or control of the State).
135. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (providing the criteria for attribution
regarding the conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental
authority).
136. Id. arts. 56, 58 (describing state and individual responsibilities otherwise
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to a PMSC, a third party appears on stage. The current trend implies
that the attention on the State's international responsibility is
diverted toward the debate about the responsibility that should be
claimed to PMSCs.13 In the same way that both types of
accountability exist in cases of concurrency of individual and state
responsibility, the resource to PMSCs cannot lead to a decline in the
State's international responsibility.'38
In this practice by the contracting state and PMSC, declining and
transferring their responsibility for infractions committed by private
contractors, no doubt exists that both parties are benefiting from
avoiding their responsibility in most of cases in detriment to
victims.'39 Given the current reality where convictions do not exist
against the States for the performance of PMSCs, the only affordable
option for victims is to seek redress by suing the private entity;
40
however, the problem that victims face when they demand before
national courts is the strategy that PMSCs are actually using. In fact,
in recent years under the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") with
respect to PMSCs,141 there have been several lawsuits presented
not regulated).
137. See MARGALIDA CAPELLA I ROIG, LA TIPIFICACI6N INTERNACIONAL DE




141. See id. at 337-39 (arguing that ATCA foresees a mechanism of civil
responsibility before U.S. courts through which the victims of violations try to
obtain reparation for harm suffered, regardless of the place of events and the
nationality of the victim, and with the only requirement to enable the Tribunal's
jurisdiction that the defendant was found on American territory at the moment of
the filing of the suit); Daniele Amoroso, Moving Towards Complicity as a
Criterion of Attribution of Private Conducts: Imputation to States of Corporate
Abuses in the US Case Law, 24 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 989, 999 (2011) (applying
ACTA to corporate human rights violations); Marta Requejo Isidro,
Responsibilidad civil y derechos humanos en EEUU. iel fin del ATS?, 2011
REViSTA PARA EL ANALISIS DEL DERECHO 1, 31 (remarking that most claims
brought under ATCA have not made it through the early stages of proceedings);
Andrew Clapham, Obligaciones dimanantes de los derechos humanos para los
* actores no estatales en situaciones de conflicto, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 1, 27-29
(2006) (arguing that based on the holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and other
cases, it can clearly be seen how the reasoning in such cases under ATCA may be
applied to PMSCs accused of human rights violations in other situations); Norman
Farrell, Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors: Some Lessons from the
International Tribunals, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 873, 884-86 (2010) (requiring that
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against private companies. 14 2 By way of example, the Center for
Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit on behalf of the Abu Ghraib
prisoners in 2004 against CACI International, Incorporated and Titan
Corporation, companies that had been contracted by the United
States to provide interrogation and interpretation services to coalition
forces in Iraq. 1
43
However, the strategy used by PMSC defendants to avoid their
responsibility is to adduce that their personnel were integrated in the
military structure of the contracting state or that the contractors
received instructions or were under the effective control of state
organs.144 Under this argument, claims brought against them by
victims should be rejected because the State would be the only
subject internationally responsible for the acts of private
the defendant must have provided substantial assistance with purpose of aiding and
abetting for liability under ACR to attach); Eric Mongelard, Responsibilidad civil
de las empresas por violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario, 88 INT'L
REv. RED CROSS 1, 16-20 (2006) (noting that ATCA case law has established that
corporations are obligated to respect interntional humanitarian law in some
capacity); Pozo Serrano & Hemndez Martin, supra note 64, at 345-47 (discussing
how ATCA has most recently come into the limelight after the lawsuit against
Blackwater employees for their actions in Iraq was filed); Francisco Javier Zamora
Cabot, La Responsibilidad e las empresas multinacionales por violaciones de los
derechos humanos: prdctica reciente, 1 HURl-AGE CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 1, 8-9
(2012) (arguing that ATCA's extraterritorially reach is limited, aside from its
significance in giving victims of human rights abuses a forum to bring their
claims); Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, Los derechosfundamentales en clave del
Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 de los EE. UU. y su aplicaci6n a las corporaciones
multinacionales: "The ATCA Revisited", CATEDRATICO DE DO INTERNACIONAL
PRIVADO 333, 351-52 (2006) (discussing the Doe v. Unocal holding, where the
federal circuit court ruled against a major corporation and applied an aiding and
abetting test to evaluate the corporation's complicity in the Burmese government's
actions).
142. See Pozo Serrano & Hemndez Martin, supra note 64, at 348 (stating more
exactly, the victims or their families may file their claims for violations of
international law, which in practice are usually directed against legal persons; since
the 1980s, its application resurged and big companies, such as Unocal,
Bridgestone, and Nestle, among others, have been sued.)
143. See id. at 346 (stating that the case against CACI International Inc. was the
first case involving PMSCs in Iraq to go to trial after the judge overseeing the case
rejected a motion to dismiss).
144. See id. at 331 (remarking that if the employees of CACI International Inc.
and Titan Corp. are deemed to be integrated into the structure of the military, their
actions would fall under the ambit of state responsibility).
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contractors. 145 As Pilar Pozo Serrano and Lourdes Hernandez Martin
note, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp. 146 addressed this argument. Indeed, in
this case, the judicial body concluded that the interpretive tasks were
performed under direct orders and exclusive control of military
personnel and consequently dismissed the suit.147 However, in the
case of Al Shimari v. CACI, the court reached a more satisfactory
conclusion, to the extent that it found that interrogators acted under a
dual chain of command (armed force and PMSC), saving its
competence to hear the case, and admitting that the company could
therefore have incurred civil responsibility.'48
Therefore, with the objective that both parties do not succeed in
transferring responsibility at the expense of the victims, the
infractions committed by the contractors in exercising the functions
delegated to the PMSC deserve the consideration of acts of the State
and consequently the contracting state has to be declared
internationally responsible. 19 A different question is when and how
the State could claim the compensation to the PMSC that it has to
pay as a result of its international responsibility. Nevertheless, these
are questions that exceed the scope of international law and have to
be resolved by the national law of each State.
B. THE LACK OF PRECEDENTS AND STATE PRACTICE
Second, the lack of precedents and state practice has led the
doctrine to sustain the precedence of different attribution criteria in
these cases. When academic world analyses the possible attribution
to the State of the wrongful acts committed by the private
contractors, it normally has recourse to the criteria contained in
145. Id.
146- 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005); see Pozo Serrano & Hermnndez Martin,
supra note 64, at 332 (describing that lawyers on behalf of the PMSCs, in its
defense, argued that the employees were fully integrated into the military's
hierarchy and therefore their actions should be considered "combat activities").
147. Pozo Serrano & Herndndez Martin, supra note 64 (noting that CACI
International Inc. employee were deemed as acting under a dual chain of command
on behalf of both the military and their company and thus they were capable of
responding "civilly").
148" Pozo Serrano & Herndmdez Martin, supra note 64, at 332 (stating that "this
interpretation refers only to the effects of the eventual civil responsibility of the
companies, but does not impact the individual responsibility of employees that
participated in such cases").
149. Id.
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articles 5 and 8 of the 2001 ILC Draft.t15 Predominantly, scholars
conclude by discarding the application of the criterion under article 5
of the 2001 ILC Draft and determining that article 8 of the 2001 ELC
Draft is applicable to these cases."' Indeed, in the first instance,
scholars often refer to the attribution criterion enshrined in article 5
of the ILC Draft at least to cover the acts performed by private
contractors that may be considered the State's the public
prerogatives, such as participating in hostilities. However, scholar
usually consider article 5 inapplicable because delegating public
authority should be in accordance with the law and that a contract
between the executive power and the private entity is an insufficient
basis for the attribution.' Based on this interpretation of the form of
the delegation of public functions,153 part of the doctrine excludes
applying article 5 and the corresponding qualification of contractors
as de jure agents, demanding the concurrence of the requirements-
instructions, direction, or control-to affirm the state responsibility
contained in article 8 of the 2001 ILC Draft and consequently the
qualification of the individuals as de facto agents. 1
54
Meanwhile, another doctrinal sector considers the concurrence of
both attribution criteria requirements is necessary, namely delegating
functions and providing the State with effective control at the
150. See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private
Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT'L REV.
RED CROss 525, 554-55 (2006) (discussing attribution of power through articles 5
and 8).
151. See id. at 555 (describing the narrow application of both articles).
152. Id. at 554-55 (maintaining that the requirement that the entity must be
empowered by the law of that State significantly limits the scope of the provision
and the existence of a contract between the State and the company is insufficient
per se to bring the latter within the scope of the provision).
153. 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 29 (remaining silent about the way that
delegation of public functions must be performed by law and failing to mention
that it takes place by executive action and that the determining factor concerns
persons or groups of persons empowered to exercise prerogatives of public power.)
154. See Francesco Francioni, Private Military Contractors and International
Law: An Introduction, 19 EUR. L.J. 961, 962 (2008) (requiring state control and
discarding the criterion contained in Article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft for
considering that the contract is not enough and maintaining that that "private
military 'contractors' are by definition only in a contractual relation with the hiring
state. Thus their acts are not in principle acts of state but acts of private people,
even though their services often entail carrying weapons and exposing other people
to the risk of injury").
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moment of the infraction.155 This cumulative requirement of both
requisites may be due to the fact that, in the only occasion where a
party raised it before the ICJ in a case relating to the application of
attribution criterion encompassed in article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft,
the global court preferred to use the criterion contained in the current
article 8 of the coded work. 156 The relevant case refers to the
judgment that ended the military and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua, in which there were concerns about the behavior
of the Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets. 1
57
However, although the attribution criterion used by the Court-if
not the most appropriate as Ago maintained in his individual
opinion,151 could be justified,159 it is unclear why the doctrine insists
155. ESPAL0 BERDUD, supra note 39, at 157-58 ("[T]he rules that we have
evidenced above on the responsibility of the state for the activities of mercenaries
apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of private military companies ... [t]hat
is, the state would not assume any responsibility unless it had control of the
operation carried out and that if the denounced conduct could be considered as an
integral part of the operation in question"); Pastor Palomar, supra note 117, 442-43
(distinguishing the responsibility of contracting states from that of host states);
Jaume Saura EstapA, Algunas reflexiones en torno a a privatizaci6n de la guerra y
la seguridad y sus consecuencias en el disfrute de los derechos humanos, in LA
PRIVATIZAC16N DEL USO DE LA FUERZA ARMADA 241, 254-55 (2009) [hereinafter
Saura Estapd, Algunas reflexiones] (arguing that determining the degree of
delegation of functions and effective control may be a herculean task-one which
requires the traditional framework of state responsibility to be refrained); Saura
EstapA, Las Empresas, supra note 35, at 16 (boiling down the definition of
"control" to mean when a State enjoys the fruits of a PMSC's labor and provides it
legal impunity for its acts); Urbina, supra note 45 (maintaining that "the condition
of belonging to a party to the conflict means the existence of a factual link between
the armed group in question and the state whose name it acts .... [which] in the
case of PMSCs, this requisite would be met with the existence of a contract with
the state in which the functions that the company will have to play in its name are
defined").
156. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 45-46 (June 27) (using article 8 in place of
article 5 criterion in considering actions of persons acting on the instruction of the
United States).
157. Id. (when referring to acts committed by this group that were attributed to
the United States, the Court considered that it was indeed in presence of persons
acting on behalf of the state and falls under the criterion provided in Article 8(a) of
1996 ILC Draft and providing that the ICJ considered: (1) the existence of specific
instructions in relation to acts contrary to international law; (2) action under the
supervision of American authorities; and (3) Participation of American agents in
the planning, direction, support, and execution of operations).
158. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Ago) (opining that the conclusion reached
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that the requirements of both criteria overlap. Even more, when the
commentaries of the ILC expressly stated that, in those cases, unlike
the application of article 8, "it is not necessary to show that the
behavior was effectively verified under the control of the State,"' 160
and the ICJ now recognizes the customary nature of the attribution
criterion set out in article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft.
C. STATES INCUR INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
VIOLATING POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
Third, the possibility is that the State incurs international
responsibility for violating positive obligations in international
humanitarian law instead of for the individual's acts. Rather than the
behavior of private contractors being attributable to the contracting
state, the doctrine sometimes provides recourse with an alternative
solution that also implies the State's international responsibility, but
for the conduct of their own organs regarding the behavior that the
contractors observed.161 The conduct of individuals or entities may
by the Court was correct, but it would have been more appropriate to attribute the
acts to the United States by way of article 7 of the 1996 ILC Draft (now article 5 of
the 2001 ILC Draft) because these were individuals who exercised elements of
governmental authority previously authorized by the state and further being paid
for the performance of those functions in the framework of the Nicaraguan
conflict).
159. But see SIMON OLLESON, BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMPARATIVE LAW,
THE IMPACT OF THE ILC's ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 64 (2007) (referencing the decision in article
8 of ILC Draft criterion, since at the time this criterion was already considered as a
part of customary international law, unlike the dubious customary nature contained
in article 5, although the conclusion reached in this particular situation would have
been exactly the same independently of whatever criterion was chosen; this implies
that the state should respond to all of the acts committed by individuals qualified as
persons who exercise prerogatives of power public, including ultra vires acts; in
contrast, considering private contractors as individuals that act under instructions
from or under the direction or control of the State, means that the State is not
responsible for ultra vires acts committed; in other words, the same result will be
achieved regardless of whether the criterion contained in article 5 or article 8 of the
2001 ILC Draft is attributed).
160. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-
Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
161. See Gillard, supra note 152, at 556 (arguing situations where acts of
contractors cannot be attributed to a State may still lead to direct responsibility of
the State for its own violations of the law because the State failed either to meet its
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not be attributable a State as a general rule. For example, the
impossibility of applying the criteria contained in articles 5 and 8 of
the 2001 ILC Draft in a specified case does not prevent the State
from possibly incurring international responsibility for the breach of
their international obligations as a result of an individual's harmful
acts. 162 Here, the origin of the responsibility lies in the behavior of
their own bodies contrary to its international obligations in
preventing and/or suppressing the individuals' acts, without
prejudice that this international responsibility sometimes entails the
obligation of the State to repair the entire damage caused by
individuals. 163
In certain areas like international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, the State currently has negative
obligations (obligations not to act) and positive obligations
(obligations to act). In the field of thejus in bello, positive obligation
entails the duty to respect and ensure respect for international
humanitarian law, as established in article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions.164 Thus, States are obliged to take all necessary
measures to ensure and guarantee that heir armed forces comply
with the provisions of this regulatory sector, which States satisfy not
only with divulgation, instruction, formation, and training of their
armed forces on these rules, but also supervising individuals. 165
The immediate question is whether contracting states have this
same obligation in relation to PMSC personnel. Contracting states
have the same obligation to PMSC personnel when the private
contractors are integrated into the armed forces or when they are
"acting on its behalf or under its direction and control."' 166 If the State
obligations under international humanitarian law or to take the necessary steps to
ensure respect for the law).
162. Id.
163. OLLESON, supra note 161, at 204 (stating this obligation to repair the full
damage usually takes place in cases of international responsibility of the State for
violation of its positive obligations in the field of international human rights law, in
accordance with the jurisprudence of the regional human rights bodies).
164. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]
(establishing this duty for contracting parties in all circumstances).
165. Gillard, supra note 152, at 551 (outlining states obligation to ensure armed
forces, including PMSCs, comply with international humanitarian law).
166. Id.
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delegates or contracts inherently state functions, does it get out of
their international obligations according to international
humanitarian law? An affirmative answer is unacceptable. With the
argument that PMSCs do not form part of the regular chain of
command and their acts are independent and not coordinated with the
military operations of the contracting state or defined by its organs,
these States argue that they are not internationally responsible for
harmful acts performed by contractors. Currently, the specific
regulatory framework is seeking to change this rule and require
States to be responsible for the harmful acts of contractors by
implementing new primary rules.167 In this sense, it should be
emphasized that one of the international obligations contained in
article 4 of the 2010 draft convention of PMSCs is the obligation of
the contracting state to ensure that private contractors respect and
comply with international humanitarian law.1
68
However, before taking into account this regulatory framework, it
is necessary to distinguish two cases to assert the responsibility of
the State for violating its positive obligations in relation to the
conduct of the PMSC. It is currently impossible to attribute the
actions of private contractors to the contracting state by applying the
attribution criteria to determine if the State incurs international
responsibility in spite of violating its international obligations.
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the State contracting
PMSC services for developing their functions in its territory during
an armed conflict or in the territory of another State. In the first case,
the State is internationally bound by the rules of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law (negative and
positive obligations). 169 In other words, the State organs are bound by
167. Id. at 553 (discussing the recent restatement of state responsibility in
international law by the ILC in the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for
International Wrongful Acts).
168. Use of Mercenaries, supra note 33, at 21 (placing responsibility for PMSC
activities on the State).
169. See Chia Lehnardt, Private Military Companies and State Responsibility 1,
16 (Inst. for Int'l Law & Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
2007/2, 2007) (holding that states are obliged to respect, protect, and guarantee
human rights and thus when it is not possible to attribute the acts of PMSC
employees to a State, States must prevent and suppress human rights violations
that may be committed by them; the degree of diligence required by the State will
depend on specific circumstances, such as the actors of the game (a protected
group), or the type of contracted activity the presence of a potentially dangerous
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the positive obligations of preventing human rights abuses in relation
to the conduct of the employees of PMSCs,17 ° in addition to due
diligence obligations that are enforceable when events take place in
the State Territory or under its jurisdiction. From the perspective of
redressing victims' rights, this solution becomes comparable to
attributing PMSC conduct to the State. If a party proves that a state
origin infringed positive obligations, the State will respond for the
full damages caused by private contractors.7' This solution is also
applicable to territories under the effective control of the State,
which includes the occupying power by direct or indirect
administration of the territory. 172
In the second kind of cases, when the State contracts the services
of PMSCs to develop their activity in the territory of the other State,
the former is not bound by their obligations concerning its territory
or zones under its jurisdiction or control. The only enforceable
obligations are the ones established by international humanitarian
law, requiring respect and ensuring respect.'73 Regarding private
contractors, the State violates these obligations if it does not
introduce specific contractual clauses concerning respect for human
rights rules in general.174 As a consequence, when it is possible to
prove that the State failed to comply with its obligations according to
activity).
170. G6MEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA MATEU, supra note 31, at 81 (commenting
that even if States outsource some of their finctions, they are still responsible for
applying their positive human rights obligations at the national level in several
dimensions, including by passing legislation and taking appropriate measures to
"prevent, investigate, sanction, and provide effective remedies for the abuses that
have been committed by PMSCs and their personnel").
171. See id. (noting that the binding legal instrument proposed by the Working
Group emphasizes the need for both measures to "promote transparency,
responsibility and accountability when contracting or subcontracting out to PMSCs
and their personnel" and the "creation of mechanisms for the rehabilitation of
victims").
172. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 226, 242 (Dec. 19) (holding the latter State
responsible for the acts committed by the rebels in zones where, previously, it had
considered this State as an occupying power).
173. Geneva Convention, supra note 166, art. 1.
174. See CANO LINARES, supra note 31; GOMEZ DEL PRADO & TORROJA
MATEU, supra note 31, at 77 (pointing out that the Security Council has so far
remained silent on the use of PMSCs, whose sole obligations are based on the
provisions of the contract they sign).
20151 833
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
international humanitarian law by not including specific clauses in
the contract, for example, it will incur international responsibility
under the basic principle that the State is responsible for the actions
of their organs.'75 However, this solution implies limiting the
international responsibility of the contracting state solely to the
violation of its international obligation to ensure respect of
international humanitarian law, in cases where it has delegated its
public functions.176 This is an unsatisfactory solution, even more so
because it seems deliberately designed by the States to incur an
international responsibility of a lesser degree. 1"
This solution favors the contracting state because it displaces the
criterion applicable in these cases and enables it to avoid the
attribution of private contractors' conduct.'78 Indeed, if a State
delegates the exercise of public functions to a PMSC and does not
supervise or exercise some control over the PMSC performing these
functions, it becomes the perfect alibi to avoid that the harmful acts
of private contractors from being considered acts of the State.'79 In
this way, the State avoids attribution of conduct of private
contractors and incurs the international responsibility not for those
acts, but for the action of their own organs in violation of their
obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. 80
175. See CANO LINARES, supra note 31, at 70 (discussing the problems that
arise when determining attribution due to different levels of state and individual
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law).
176. Id. at 76 (remarking on the use of PMSCs as "agents" or "delegates" of the
State).
177. LINDSEY CAMERON & VINCENT CHETAIL, PRIVATIZING WAR: PRIVATE
MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 126
(2013) (arguing that the international legal order has been reluctant to proscribe
privatization of state functions, particularly in regards to law enforcement and
administration, which may explain why it has focused on crafting a legal
framework for the attribution of state responsibility and enforcement of human
rights instead).
178. Id. at 112-13 (commenting that he use of the term "agent" in the Geneva
Conventions carries a caveat in that it limits the scope of those acting in the service
of a contracting state to those who owe allegiance to the state itself and indicating
that States wanted to limit their responsibility and avoid responsibility for the
actions of all private persons acting within their territory).
179. Id. (remarking that international humanitarian law does not explicitly
prohibit the actions of PMSCs during armed conflict, but limits the ways in which
they may be employed on behalf of the State).
180. Id. at 143 (stating that most PMSCs do not meet the criteria to be
considered state organs, but it is a worthwhile endeavor to examine attribution to
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In other words, acts in violation of international humanitarian law
that should be considered state acts because they are committed
when performing state functions by virtue of article 5 in conjunction
with article 7 (ultra vires acts) would end up carrying out at most an
international responsibility of the contracting state that would not
imply the reparation of the damage caused by the private
contractors.8' It is therefore extremely simplistic for the State in
these cases to elude its responsibility. It effectively allows States to
delegate the use of force to a PMSC and disengage from the
execution of the entrusted mission. This solution completely
discourages States from supervising and controlling the exercise of
functions delegated to PMSCs.182 This second group of cases are
instances where the contracting state is not the Territorial State, a
very common situation concerning countries that often have recourse
to the services of PMSCs to operate abroad.'83
IV. CONCLUSION
To conclude, the court must refer to the attribution criteria under
article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft in the cases where a State generally
empowers a private company to exercise public power prerogatives,
regardless of how the attribution took place or if the State intervenes
or not in the performing of the delegated functions by means of
instructions or orders.'84 Consequently, the entire behavior of persons
who develop the authorized state function, whether intra or ultra
vires, has to be attributed to the State to determine its international
responsibility. 185
PMSCs and state organs under the same lens).
181. Draft Articles, supra note 1, arts. 5, 7 (mandating that the person must be
acting in capacity of the State for international norms to apply).
182. CAMERON & CHETAIL, supra note 179, at 220 ("[W]hen the private
company is acting under the direct supervision of an organ of the state or arguably
in a military run facility under the control of the state [ ... ] responsibility of the
state will remain even if particular instructions have been exceeded or have not
been followed").
183. Id. at 281-82 (distinguishing between the interests and responsibilities of
territorial states and contracting states).
184. Draft Articles, supra note 1, art. 5 (outlining guidelines where a person is
empowered by state law to exercise government authority).
185. CAMERON & CHETAIL, supra note 179, at 219-20 (referencing the
academic debate over which entities may be held responsible for ultra vires acts by
private actors under effective state control).
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These arguments are closely linked to basic and traditional
principles of responsibility. In fact, a traditional principle that has
inspired the rules of domestic legislation in responsibility issues is
that of in eligendo or in vigilando fault. 186 The ultimate basis of the
attribution criterion contained in article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft may
be this principle commonly accepted by domestic legal systems. 87
According to it, the employer responds for his employees' acts when
they intervene in fulfilling the employer's obligation on their own
initiative. 188 Thus, it is possible to appreciate in eligendo or in
vigilando fault when the employer entitles another person to comply
with his own obligations in its own interest. This responsibility also
arises when the performance of the employee develops without a
dependent relationship with the employer or, rather independently. 189
The attribution criterion follows the same legal logic that is behind
the in eligendo or in vigilando fault doctrine. 190 Inasmuch as it refers
to a State delegating or contracting public functions to persons or
entities, the factual situation contemplated is exactly the same.191
Hence, the legal remedy should be exactly the same: the
responsibility lies with the State who delegates the state function.
Bearing in mind that the underlying premise of the draft
convention is no delegation or contract of inherently state functions,
article 5 criterion must be applied to cases concerning hiring PMSCs.
The lack of precedents does not exclude the reasonableness of this
solution. In other cases, it would be difficult to explain the interest of
the U.S. Department of Defense to pass a regulation in 2005 in which
it becomes clear "that the private sector is excluded from exercising
186. Saura EstapA, Las Empresas, supra note 35, at 17-18 (defining in eligendo
fault as corporate responsibility where violations are committed by poorly skilled
personnel of PMSCs under little control and that perform military functions
without clearly understanding the lines of control and explaining in vigilando fault
as where PMSCs are responsible for the lack of verification and control of the
illegal activities of their employees).
187. Saura EstapA, Algunas reflexiones, supra note 157, at 254-55.
188. Saura EstapA, Las Empresas, supra note 35, at 17-18.
189. Saura Estapd, Algunas reflexiones, upra note 157, at 255.
190. Id.; Saura Estapd, Las Empresas, supra note 35, at 17-18 (noting the
internationalist doctrine refers to the fault in eligendo and in vigilando not to
reinforce the argument for state attribution of private contractors' behavior, but to
consider the PMSC responsible and asserting that PMSCs may incur responsibility
in applying these two principles of civil law).
191. Saura EstapA, Las Empresas, supra note 35, at 17-18.
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functions and duties that are inherently governmental in nature."' 192
Similarly, in the context of international responsibility, it may not be
rational for the State to be disassociated from a contractor, when
guaranteeing their immunity grants them the same treatment as
dispensed to the members of their armed forces.
In this sense, "private military and security companies form part of
the war machine of the States;" in the Pentagon words, they
"constitute one of the elements of the 'Total Force' of the United
States," together with "active and in the reserve military and civil
servants."193 This is one of the reasons why this State has negotiated
impunity of PMSC employees in conjunction with the members of
their armed forces.194 As Kai Ambos notes, Washington strived to
ensure the immunity of its military, as well as PMSC employees. 195
By Security Council Resolution 1422 of June 12th, 2001 (extended
by the June 12th, 2003 Resolution 1478), which expressly refers to
"civil servants, former civil servants, staff, or former staff of any
State not party to," the United States sought to exclude from the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court not only the members
of its armed forces, but also private contractors, such as mercenaries
of private security companies. 196 In the same way, immunity is
achieved at the bilateral level through treaties known as non-delivery
of their national agreements. 197 Like the mentioned Resolutions, the
192. Perrin, supra note 42, at 316, 319.
193. Pastor Palomar, supra note 116, at 428 (noting that this particular
characterization of PMSCs impacts whether Blackwater employees should be
construed as "functionally" or "structurally" part of the armed forces).
194. Id. (commenting that increased interdependence of PMSCs and armed
forces should not undermine the "essence of the international legal order").
195. Kai Ambos, Inmunidades en derecho (penal) nacional e internacional,
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 691, 708 (2005)
(pointing out that the United States sought to extend immunity to PMSC
employees and its own forces due to their involvement in previous and current
wars).
196. Id.; see also S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (Jun. 12, 2001)
(requesting the International Criminal Court not to proceed with an investigation or
prosecution into cases "involving current or former officials or personnel from a
contributing state not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to
a United Nations established or authorized operation" without the Security
Council's approval).
197. Ambos, supra note 195, at 709 (quoting the agreements, which state that
the term "person of the United States" should be interpreted as "any officer,
employee (including any contractor), or member of the military, current or former
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conventions are extended not only to the militaries but also to PMSC
employees.198 Could the United States' attitude be interpreted as a
way to equate militaries and contractors? These concerns of
Washington to procure identical immunity are not a clear indication
of the equalization in their job and mission.
In sum, in the last six years, more and more voices calling for the
acts of PMSC employees to be regarded under article 5 of the 2001
ILC Draft. 199 However, along with these doctrinal positions in favor
of the solution, this article supports the third comment to Rule 149 of
the ICRC study on the customary rules of international humanitarian
law.2 °0 Indeed, under the heading "Responsibility of the State for
violations committed by persons or entities authorized to exercise
prerogatives of governmental authority," it expressly states that the
States are still responsible for the acts of private companies
employed for armed forces to perform tasks that usually are
developed by the army.
20 1
service").
198. Id. at 710 (commenting that the agreements are analogous to Security
Council Resolution 1422, in that they extend to all U.S. citizens, not just members
of the military).
199. See Rend Vark, State Responsibility for Private Armed Groups in the
Context of Terrorism, 11 JURIDICA INT'L 184, 188 (2006) (arguing it would be
imprudent to deny state responsibility for private conduct when State is using
individuals as its de facto agents); see also CANO LINARES, supra note 31, at 76
(arguing for the need to regulate the actions of PMSCs on a national level in light
of the insufficient response of the international actors towards PMSCs); Pozo
Serrano & Hemdndez Martin, supra note 64, at 348-49 (highlighting the
establishment of organizations, such as the British Association of Private Security
Companies or the Private Security Company Association Iraq, which aim to
improve the standards of PMSCs and increase compliance with the principles of
international humanitarian law and human rights law).
200. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, EL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO CONSUETUDINARIO 599 (2007). The authors argue
that a State is: responsible for the international humanitarian law violations that are
attributable to it, in particular: a) violations committed by its bodies, including
their armed forces; b) violations committed by persons or entities authorized to
exercise elements of their governmental authority; c) violations committed by
persons or groups of persons acting in fact obeying their instructions or under their
command or control; and, d) violations committed by persons or groups whose
conduct it recognizes and accepts as proper. Id.
201. Id. at 602.
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